Limbona vs. Mangelin

GR No. 80391 28 February 1989

Facts: Petitioner, Sultan Alimbusar Limbona, was elected Speaker of the Regional Legislative Assembly or Batasang Pampook of Central Mindanao (Assembly). On October 21, 1987 Congressman Datu Guimid Matalam, Chairman of the Committee on Muslim Affairs of the House of Representatives, invited petitioner in his capacity as Speaker of the Assembly of Region XII in a consultation/dialogue with local government officials. Petitioner accepted the invitation and informed the Assembly members through the Assembly Secretary that there shall be no session in November as his presence was needed in the house committee hearing of Congress. However, on November 2, 1987, the Assembly held a session in defiance of the Limbona's advice, where he was unseated from his position. Petitioner prays that the session's proceedings be declared null and void and be it declared that he was still the Speaker of the Assembly. Pending further proceedings of the case, the SC received a resolution from the Assembly expressly expelling petitioner's membership therefrom. Respondents argue that petitioner had "filed a case before the Supreme Court against some members of the Assembly on a question which should have been resolved within the confines of the Assembly," for which the respondents now submit that the petition had become "moot and academic" because its resolution.

Issue: Whether or not the courts of law have jurisdiction over the autonomous governments or regions. What is the extent of self-government given to the autonomous governments of Region XII?

Held: Autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There is decentralization of administration when the central government delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power and in the process to make local governments "more responsive and accountable". At the same time, it relieves the central government of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The President exercises "general supervision" over them, but only to "ensure that local affairs are administered according to law." He has no control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own. Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in the favor of local governments units declared to be autonomous. In that case, the autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from central authorities.

An autonomous government that enjoys autonomy of the latter category [CONST. (1987), Art. X, Sec. 15.] is subject alone to the decree of the organic act creating it and accepted principles on the effects and limits of "autonomy." On the other hand, an autonomous government of the former class is, as we noted, under the supervision of the national government acting through the President (and the Department of Local Government). If the Sangguniang Pampook (of Region XII), then, is autonomous in the latter sense, its acts are, debatably beyond the domain of this Court in perhaps the same way that the internal acts, say, of the Congress of the Philippines are beyond our jurisdiction. But if it is autonomous in the former category only, it comes unarguably under our jurisdiction. An examination of the very Presidential Decree creating the autonomous governments of Mindanao persuades us that they were never meant to exercise autonomy in the second sense (decentralization of power). PD No. 1618, in the first place, mandates that "[t]he President shall have the power of general supervision and control over Autonomous Regions." Hence, we assume jurisdiction. And if we can make an inquiry in the validity of the expulsion in question, with more reason can we review the petitioner's removal as Speaker.

This case involves the application of a most

important constitutional policy and principle, that of local autonomy. We have to obey the clear mandate on local autonomy.

Where a law is capable of two interpretations, one in favor of centralized power in Malacañang and the other beneficial to local autonomy, the scales must be weighed in favor of autonomy.

Upon the facts presented, we hold that the November 2 and 5, 1987 sessions were invalid. It is true that under Section 31 of the Region XII Sanggunian Rules, "[s]essions shall not be suspended or adjourned except by direction of the Sangguniang Pampook". But while this opinion is in accord with the respondents' own, we still invalidate the twin sessions in question, since at the time the petitioner called the "recess," it was not a settled matter whether or not he could do so. In the second place, the invitation tendered by the Committee on Muslim Affairs of the House of Representatives provided a plausible reason for the intermission sought. Also, assuming that a valid recess could not be called, it does not appear that the respondents called his attention to this mistake. What appears is that instead, they opened the sessions themselves behind his back in an apparent act of mutiny. Under the circumstances, we find equity on his side. For this reason, we uphold the "recess" called on the ground of good faith.

San Juan vs. Civil Service Commisssion

GR No. 92299, 19 April 1991

Facts: The Provincial Budget Officer of Rizal (PBO) was left vacant; thereafter Rizal Governor San Juan, peititioner, nominated Dalisay Santos for the position and the latter quickly assumed position. However, Director Abella of Region IV Department of Budget and Management (DBM) did not endorse the nominee, and recommended private respondent Cecilia Almajose as PBO on the ground that she was the most qualified. This appointment was subsequently approved by the DBM. Petitioner protested the appointment of Almajose before the DBM and the Civil Service Commission who both dismissed his complaints. His arguments rest on his contention that he has the sole right and privilege to recommend the nominees to the position of PBO and that the appointee should come only from his nominees. In support thereof, he invokes Section 1 of Executive Order No. 112.

Issue: Whether or not DBM is empowered to appoint a PBO who was not expressly nominated by the provincial governor.

Held: Under the cited Sec 1 of EO 112, the petitioner's power to recommend is subject to the qualifications prescribed by existing laws for the position of PBO. Consequently, in the event that the recommendations made by the petitioner fall short of the required standards, the appointing authority, public respondent DBM is expected to reject the same. In the event that the Governor recommends an unqualified person, is the Department Head free to appoint anyone he fancies?

Petitioner states that the phrase of said law: "upon recommendation of the local chief executive concerned" must be given mandatory application in consonance with the state policy of local autonomy as guaranteed by the 1987 Constitution under Art. II, Sec. 25 and Art. X, Sec. 2 thereof. He further argues that his power to recommend cannot validly be defeated by a mere administrative issuance of public respondent DBM reserving to itself the right to fill-up any existing vacancy in case the petitioner's nominees do not meet the qualification requirements as embodied in public respondent DBM's Local Budget Circular No. 31 dated February 9, 1988.

This case involves the application of a most important constitutional policy and principle, that of local autonomy. We have to obey the clear mandate on local autonomy. Where a law is capable of two interpretations, one in favor of centralized power in Malacañang and the other beneficial to local autonomy, the scales must be weighed in favor of autonomy.

The 1935 Constitution clearly limited the executive power over local governments to "general supervision . . . as may be provided by law." The President controls the executive departments. He has no such power over local governments. He has only supervision and that supervision is both general and circumscribed by statute. The exercise of greater local autonomy is even more marked in the present Constitution. Article II, Section 25 provides: "The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments"

Thereby, DBM Circular is ultra vires and is, accordingly, set aside. The DBM may appoint only from the list of qualified recommendees nominated by the Governor. If none is qualified, he must return the list of nominees to the Governor explaining why no one meets the legal requirements and ask for new recommendees who have the necessary eligibilities and qualifications.