Limbona vs. Mangelin

GR No. 80391 28 February 1989

Facts: Petitioner, Sultan Alimbusar Limbona, was elected Speaker of the Regional Legislative Assembly or Batasang Pampook of Central Mindanao (Assembly). On October 21, 1987 Congressman Datu Guimid Matalam, Chairman of the Committee on Muslim Affairs of the House of Representatives, invited petitioner in his capacity as Speaker of the Assembly of Region XII in a consultation/dialogue with local government officials. Petitioner accepted the invitation and informed the Assembly members through the Assembly Secretary that there shall be no session in November as his presence was needed in the house committee hearing of Congress. However, on November 2, 1987, the Assembly held a session in defiance of the Limbona's advice, where he was unseated from his position. Petitioner prays that the session's proceedings be declared null and void and be it declared that he was still the Speaker of the Assembly. Pending further proceedings of the case, the SC received a resolution from the Assembly expressly expelling petitioner's membership therefrom. Respondents argue that petitioner had "filed a case before the Supreme Court against some members of the Assembly on a question which should have been resolved within the confines of the Assembly," for which the respondents now submit that the petition had become "moot and academic" because its resolution.

Issue: Whether or not the courts of law have jurisdiction over the autonomous governments or regions. What is the extent of self-government given to the autonomous governments of Region XII?

Held: Autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There is decentralization of administration when the central government delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power and in the process to make local governments "more responsive and accountable". At the same time, it relieves the central government of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The President exercises "general supervision" over them, but only to "ensure that local affairs are administered according to law." He has no control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own. Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in the favor of local governments units declared to be autonomous. In that case, the autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from central authorities.

An autonomous government that enjoys autonomy of the latter category [CONST. (1987), Art. X, Sec. 15.] is subject alone to the decree of the organic act creating it and accepted principles on the effects and limits of "autonomy." On the other hand, an autonomous government of the former class is, as we noted, under the supervision of the national government acting through the President (and the Department of Local Government). If the Sangguniang Pampook (of Region XII), then, is autonomous in the latter sense, its acts are, debatably beyond the domain of this Court in perhaps the same way that the internal acts, say, of the Congress of the Philippines are beyond our jurisdiction. But if it is autonomous in the former category only, it comes unarguably under our jurisdiction. An examination of the very Presidential Decree creating the autonomous governments of Mindanao persuades us that they were never meant to exercise autonomy in the second sense (decentralization of power). PD No. 1618, in the first place, mandates that "[t]he President shall have the power of general supervision and control over Autonomous Regions." Hence, we assume jurisdiction. And if we can make an inquiry in the validity of the expulsion in question, with more reason can we review the petitioner's removal as Speaker.

This case involves the application of a most

important constitutional policy and principle, that of local autonomy. We have to obey the clear mandate on local autonomy.

Where a law is capable of two interpretations, one in favor of centralized power in Malacañang and the other beneficial to local autonomy, the scales must be weighed in favor of autonomy.

Upon the facts presented, we hold that the November 2 and 5, 1987 sessions were invalid. It is true that under Section 31 of the Region XII Sanggunian Rules, "[s]essions shall not be suspended or adjourned except by direction of the Sangguniang Pampook". But while this opinion is in accord with the respondents' own, we still invalidate the twin sessions in question, since at the time the petitioner called the "recess," it was not a settled matter whether or not he could do so. In the second place, the invitation tendered by the Committee on Muslim Affairs of the House of Representatives provided a plausible reason for the intermission sought. Also, assuming that a valid recess could not be called, it does not appear that the respondents called his attention to this mistake. What appears is that instead, they opened the sessions themselves behind his back in an apparent act of mutiny. Under the circumstances, we find equity on his side. For this reason, we uphold the "recess" called on the ground of good faith.

San Juan vs. Civil Service Commisssion

GR No. 92299, 19 April 1991

Facts: The Provincial Budget Officer of Rizal (PBO) was left vacant; thereafter Rizal Governor San Juan, peititioner, nominated Dalisay Santos for the position and the latter quickly assumed position. However, Director Abella of Region IV Department of Budget and Management (DBM) did not endorse the nominee, and recommended private respondent Cecilia Almajose as PBO on the ground that she was the most qualified. This appointment was subsequently approved by the DBM. Petitioner protested the appointment of Almajose before the DBM and the Civil Service Commission who both dismissed his complaints. His arguments rest on his contention that he has the sole right and privilege to recommend the nominees to the position of PBO and that the appointee should come only from his nominees. In support thereof, he invokes Section 1 of Executive Order No. 112.

Issue: Whether or not DBM is empowered to appoint a PBO who was not expressly nominated by the provincial governor.

Held: Under the cited Sec 1 of EO 112, the petitioner's power to recommend is subject to the qualifications prescribed by existing laws for the position of PBO. Consequently, in the event that the recommendations made by the petitioner fall short of the required standards, the appointing authority, public respondent DBM is expected to reject the same. In the event that the Governor recommends an unqualified person, is the Department Head free to appoint anyone he fancies?

Petitioner states that the phrase of said law: "upon recommendation of the local chief executive concerned" must be given mandatory application in consonance with the state policy of local autonomy as guaranteed by the 1987 Constitution under Art. II, Sec. 25 and Art. X, Sec. 2 thereof. He further argues that his power to recommend cannot validly be defeated by a mere administrative issuance of public respondent DBM reserving to itself the right to fill-up any existing vacancy in case the petitioner's nominees do not meet the qualification requirements as embodied in public respondent DBM's Local Budget Circular No. 31 dated February 9, 1988.

This case involves the application of a most important constitutional policy and principle, that of local autonomy. We have to obey the clear mandate on local autonomy. Where a law is capable of two interpretations, one in favor of centralized power in Malacañang and the other beneficial to local autonomy, the scales must be weighed in favor of autonomy.

The 1935 Constitution clearly limited the executive power over local governments to "general supervision . . . as may be provided by law." The President controls the executive departments. He has no such power over local governments. He has only supervision and that supervision is both general and circumscribed by statute. The exercise of greater local autonomy is even more marked in the present Constitution. Article II, Section 25 provides: "The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments"

Thereby, DBM Circular is ultra vires and is, accordingly, set aside. The DBM may appoint only from the list of qualified recommendees nominated by the Governor. If none is qualified, he must return the list of nominees to the Governor explaining why no one meets the legal requirements and ask for new recommendees who have the necessary eligibilities and qualifications.

Aznar vs. Court of Tax Appeals

GR No. 20569, 23 August 1974

Facts: Petitioner, as administrator of the estate of the deceased, Matias H. Aznar, seeks a review and nullification of the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals ordering the petitioner to pay the government the sum of P227,691.77 representing deficiency income taxes for the years 1946 to 1951. An investigation by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) ascertained the assets and liabilities of the taxpayer and it was discovered that from 1946 to 1951, his net worth had increased every year, which increases in net worth was very much more than the income reported during said years. The findings clearly indicated that the taxpayer did not declare correctly the income reported in his income tax returns for the aforesaid years. Petitioner avers that according to the NIRC, the right of the CIR to assess deficiency income taxes of the late Aznar for the years 1946, 1947, and 1948 had already prescribed at the time the assessment was made on November 28, 1952; there being a five year limitation upon assessment and collection from the filing of the returns. Meanwhile, respondents believe that the prescription period in the case at bar that is applicable is under Sec. 332 of the NIRC which provides that: "(a) In the case of a false or fraudulent return with intent to evade tax or of a failure to file a return, the tax may be assessed, or a proceeding in court for the collection of such tax may be begun without assessment, at any time within ten years after the discovery of the falsity, fraud or omission". Petitioner argues said provision does not apply because the taxpayer did not file false and fraudulent returns with intent to evade tax.

Issue: Whether or not the deceased Aznar filed false or fraudulent income tax returns and subsequently, whether the action has not prescribed.


Held: The petition is without merit.
The respondent CTA concluded that the very "substantial under declarations of income for six consecutive years eloquently demonstrate the falsity or fraudulence of the income tax returns with an intent to evade the payment of tax." The ordinary period of prescription of 5 years within which to assess tax liabilities under Sec. 331 of the NIRC should be applicable to normal circumstances, but whenever the government is placed at a disadvantage so as to prevent its lawful agents from proper assessment of tax liabilities due to false returns, fraudulent return intended to evade payment of tax, or failure to file returns, the period of ten years from the time of the discovery of the falsity, fraud or omission even seems to be inadequate. There being undoubtedly false tax returns in this case, We affirm the conclusion of the respondent Court of Tax Appeals that Sec. 332 (a) of the NIRC should apply and that the period of ten years within which to assess petitioner's tax liability had not expired at the time said assessment was made.

Sison vs Ancheta

GR No. L-59431, 25 July 1984

Facts: Section 1 of BP Blg 135 amended the Tax Code and petitioner Antero M. Sison, as taxpayer, alleges that "he would be unduly discriminated against by the imposition of higher rates of tax upon his income arising from the exercise of his profession vis-a-vis those which are imposed upon fixed income or salaried individual taxpayers. He characterizes said provision as arbitrary amounting to class legislation, oppressive and capricious in character. It therefore violates both the equal protection and due process clauses of the Constitution as well asof the rule requiring uniformity in taxation.

Issue: Whether or not the assailed provision violates the equal protection and due process clauses of the Constitution while also violating the rule that taxes must be uniform and equitable.

Held: The petition is without merit.
On due process - it is undoubted that it may be invoked where a taxing statute is so arbitrary that it finds no support in the Constitution. An obvious example is where it can be shown to amount to the confiscation of property from abuse of power. Petitioner alleges arbitrariness but his mere allegation does not suffice and there must be a factual foundation of such unconsitutional taint.
On equal protection - it suffices that the laws operate equally and uniformly on all persons under similar circumstances, both in the privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed.
On the matter that the rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable - this requirement is met when the tax operates with the same force and effect in every place where the subject may be found." Also, :the rule of uniformity does not call for perfect uniformity or perfect equality, because this is hardly unattainable." When the problem of classification became of issue, the Court said: "Equality and uniformity in taxation means that all taxable articles or kinds of property of the same class shall be taxed the same rate. The taxing power has the authority to make reasonable and natural classifications for purposes of taxation..." As provided by this Court, where "the differentation" complained of "conforms to the practical dictates of justice and equity" it "is not discriminatory within the meaning of this clause and is therefore uniform."

Municipality of Makati vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. Nos. 89898-99 October 1, 1990

Facts: Petitioner Municipality of Makati expropriated a portion of land owned by private respondents, Admiral Finance Creditors Consortium, Inc. After proceedings, the RTC of Makati determined the cost of the said land which the petitioner must pay to the private respondents amounting to P5,291,666.00 minus the advanced payment of P338,160.00. It issued the corresponding writ of execution accompanied with a writ of garnishment of funds of the petitioner which was deposited in PNB. However, such order was opposed by petitioner through a motion for reconsideration, contending that its funds at the PNB could neither be garnished nor levied upon execution, for to do so would result in the disbursement of public funds without the proper appropriation required under the law, citing the case of Republic of the Philippines v. Palacio.The RTC dismissed such motion, which was appealed to the Court of Appeals; the latter affirmed said dismissal and petitioner now filed this petition for review.

Issue: Whether or not funds of the Municipality of Makati are exempt from garnishment and levy upon execution.

Held: It is petitioner's main contention that the orders of respondent RTC judge involved the net amount of P4,965,506.45, wherein the funds garnished by respondent sheriff are in excess of P99,743.94, which are public fund and thereby are exempted from execution without the proper appropriation required under the law. There is merit in this contention. In this jurisdiction, well-settled is the rule that public funds are not subject to levy and execution, unless otherwise provided for by statute. Municipal revenues derived from taxes, licenses and market fees, and which are intended primarily and exclusively for the purpose of financing the governmental activities and functions of the municipality, are exempt from execution. Absent a showing that the municipal council of Makati has passed an ordinance appropriating the said amount from its public funds deposited in their PNB account, no levy under execution may be validly effected. However, this court orders petitioner to pay for the said land which has been in their use already. This Court will not condone petitioner's blatant refusal to settle its legal obligation arising from expropriation of land they are already enjoying. The State's power of eminent domain should be exercised within the bounds of fair play and justice.
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Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Cebu Portland Cement Co.

G.R. No. L-29059, 15 December 1987

Facts: CTA decision ordered the petitioner CIR to refund to the Cebu Portland Cement Company, respondent, P 359,408.98 representing overpayments of ad valorem taxes on cement sold by it.  Execution of judgement was opposed by the petitioner citing that private respondent had an outstanding sales tax liability to which the judgment debt had already been credited. In fact, there was still a P4 M plus balance they owed. The Court of Tax Appeals, in holding that the alleged sales tax liability of the private respondent was still being questioned and therefore could not be set-off against the refund, granted private respondent's motion. The private respondent questioned the assessed tax based on Article 186 of the Tax Code, contending that cement was adjudged a mineral and not a manufactured product; and thusly they were not liable for their alleged tax deficiency. Thereby, petitioner filed this petition for review.

Issue: Whether or not assessment of taxes can be enforced even if there is a case contesting it.

Held: The argument that the assessment cannot as yet be enforced because it is still being contested loses sight of the urgency of the need to collect taxes as "the lifeblood of the government." If the payment of taxes could be postponed by simply questioning their validity, the machinery of the state would grind to a halt and all government functions would be paralyzed. That is the reason why, save for the exception in RA 1125 , the Tax Code provides that injunction is not available to restrain collection of tax. Thereby, we hold that the respondent Court of Tax Appeals erred in its order.